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The Maquiladora Problem in the Age of NAFrA: Where
Will We Find Solutions?
David Voigt
Mexico's maquiladora industry' has led to a tremendous
amount of industrial development along the Mexican border
with the United States in the last 25 years.2 This manufacturing
corridor has provided a much needed boost to the Mexican econ-
omy, and has created hundreds of thousands of jobs.3 The devel-
opment of the maquiladora industry, however, has not come
without costs. When the industry began, Mexico had little envi-
ronmental regulation. As the industry grew, the improper dis-
posal of hazardous waste by maquiladoras turned much of the
border between Mexico and the United States into an environ-
mental disaster zone.4 This phenomenon of environmental deg-
radation will be referred to as the "maquiladora problem."
The recent signing of the North American Free Trade
Agreement (NAFTA)5 and the increase in economic interaction
1. A maquiladora is a foreign owned production plant in Mexico in which
raw materials and component parts are imported duty-free, and finished prod-
ucts are exported back to the country from which the raw materials originated,
with duties charged only on the value added in Mexico. See infra part I.A. The
"maquiladora industry" refers to Mexico's in-bond industry. See infra note 14
and accompanying text.
2. Since 1983, the maquiladora industry has grown at a phenomenal rate.
Abelardo L. Valdez, Expanding the Concept of Coproduction Beyond the Maqui-
ladora: Toward a More Effective Partnership Between the United States and
Mexico, and the Caribbean Based Countries, 22 INT'L LAw. 393, 394 (1988). For
several years now, the maquiladora industry has been Mexico's second largest
source of foreign exchange, following only the petroleum/hydrocarbons indus-
try. Id. at 397 n.18.
3. As of November 1991, 379,772 people were employed at 1,739 maqui-
ladoras along the U.S.-Mexico border. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY,
SUMMARY - ENVIRONMENTAL PLAN FOR THE MEXICAN-U.S. BORDER AREA 9
(1992) [hereinafter EPA BORDER PLAN SuMMARY]. This is an increase of 52%
and 117% respectively over the figures from just 5 years earlier. As of 1986, the
maquiladora industry employed almost 250,000 workers in 800 maquiladoras.
Valdez, supra note 2, at 398.
4. See infra note 24 and accompanying text.
5. The North American Free Trade Agreement, the parties to which are
the United States, Mexico, and Canada, was completed on September 6, 1992
and was signed on December 17, 1992 by U.S. President Bush, Canadian Prime
Minister Mulroney, and Mexican President Salinas. The Agreement has not
yet been approved by the U.S. Congress. North American Free Trade Agree-
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between the United States and Mexico have drawn a great deal
of attention to the maquiladora problem. Environmentalists
fear that the problem will worsen if immediate remedial action
is not taken.6 Many had hoped that NAFTA would specifically
address the problem and offer tangible solutions. Others argue
that the economic benefits NAFTA generates will facilitate en-
vironmental clean-up and protection along the border.7
This Note explores the degree to which NAFTA offers solu-
tions to the maquiladora problem, and assesses the feasibility of
alternative solutions. Part I examines the history and future of
the maquiladora program, and the significance of the pollution
problem. Part II provides a background of the legal and regula-
tory structure governing the maquiladora industry. Part III pro-
vides an analysis of NAFTA's environmental provisions and how
they may affect the maquiladora problem. Finally, Part IV ex-
plores non-NAFTA solutions to the problem. This Note con-
cludes that, although NAFTA does not offer adequate solutions
to the maquiladora problem, it may help facilitate the successful
implementation of other solutions.
I. THE MAQUILADORA PROGRAM
A. HISTORY
Maquiladoras are manufacturing plants in Mexico that im-
port raw materials or component parts duty free, process or as-
semble them, export the finished products back to the country
of origin, and pay tariffs only on the value added in Mexico.8
Maquiladoras are foreign owned and managed,9 allowing the
ment, Dec. 17, 1992, U.S.-Mexico-Canada, (Draft of Sept. 6, 1992) [hereinafter
NAFTA].
6. Critics of NAFTA fear that the treaty will turn Mexico into a "pollu-
tion haven" as Mexico attempts to attract foreign investment. Malissa H. Mc-
Keith & Mary Hall, Environmental Compromise: Striking the Balance
Between Trade and Ecology, 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 724 (Nov. 4, 1992).
7. This proposition has divided environmentalists. Some believe that to
get rich first, and then clean up later, is a fundamentally flawed concept, see
infra text accompanying note 198; while others believe the economic benefits
NAFTA will generate are the only hope for environmental improvement, see
infra note 200.
8. These reduced tariffs are defined in Tariff Schedules of the United
States, 19 U.S.C. § 1202. Their purpose is to facilitate and encourage the partici-
pation of U.S. companies in this type of foreign manufacturing program. These
incentives make manufacturing programs such as that offered by the maqui-
ladora industry especially attractive to U.S. corporations. Valdez, supra note 2,
at 396.
9. Foreign ownership under the maquiladora program is permitted as an
exception to Mexican law. Under Mexico's Foreign Investment Law, majority
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owners to take advantage of Mexico's relatively inexpensive la-
bor costs.10 This type of operation can be described as a system
of coproduction, whereby two or more countries combine the
human resources of one country with the natural resources or
raw materials of another to develop a single product.1 Most ma-
quiladoras are American owned, and are principally located on
the Mexican side of the region running along the U.S.-Mexico
border from Tijuana to Matamoros.12 Under the maquiladora
program, Mexico does not impose tariffs and customs duties on
input materials, equipment, and machinery designated for pro-
duction in a maquiladora.13 This duty-free status is subject to a
guarantee by the company that the finished product will eventu-
ally be exported back to the country from which the parts and
components originated.' 4 Upon export back to the United
foreign ownership in Mexican companies is prohibited. Ley para Promover la
Inversi6n Mexicana y Regular la Inversi6n Extranjera, D.O., Mar. 19, 1973, cited
in Cheryl Schechter & David Brill, Jr., Maquilad oras: Will the Program Con-
tinue? 23 ST. MARY'S L.J. 697, 702 n.23 (1992). Prior to the passage of the For-
eign Investment Law in 1973, the Mexican government restricted foreign
investment under Art. 27 of the Mexican Constitution. MEX. CONST. art. 27,
cited in Schechter & Brill, supra, at 702.
10. Mexican labor costs are substantially lower than those in the United
States. Malissa H. McKeith, Environmental Provisions Affecting Businesses
on the US./Mexico Border, 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 245 (Apr. 22, 1992) [here-
inafter BNA Environmental Provisions].
11. Coproduction systems essentially split the manufacturing process be-
tween two or more countries. This creates a more efficient and economical
means of manufacturing by minimizing the cost of each resource. By combining
each country's human, natural, and technical resources, coproduction systems
allow transnational companies to expand profit margins and compete more ef-
fectively in global markets. Valdez, supra note 2, at 393-94.
12. Most maquiladoras are located within 14 Mexican Cities. Each of these
cities is one of a pair of sister cities, with one city on each side of the U.S.-
Mexico border. These sister cities include: Tijuana, Baja California and San
Diego, California; Mexicali, Baja California and Calixico, California; San Luis
Rio Colorado, Sonora and Yuma, Arizona; Nogales, Sonora and Nogales, Ari-
zona; Agua Prieta, Sonora and Douglas, Arizona; Naco, Sonora and Naco, Ari-
zona; Las Palomas, Chihuahua and Colombus, New Mexico; Ciudad Juarez,
Chihuahua and El Paso, Texas; Ojinaga, Chihuahua and Presidio, Texas; Ciudad
Acuna, Coahuila and Del Rio, Texas; Piedras Negras, Coahuila and Eagle Pass,
Texas; Nuevo Laredo, Tamaulipas and Laredo, Texas; Reynosa, Tamaulipas and
McAllen, Texas; and Matamoros, Tamaulipas and Brownsville, Texas. EPA
BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 7.
13. This is a direct incentive provided by the Government of Mexico to en-
courage continued growth in the maquiladora industry. Recognizing the eco-
nomic advantages that come with further development, Mexico has employed a
variety of such incentives to encourage U.S. investment in co-production activi-
ties. Valdez, supra note 2, at 394, 399-400.
14. Schechter & Brill, supra note 9, at 698. Companies must also post a
bond as part of the guarantee that finished products will be exported. Malissa
1993]
MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
States, the U.S. government applies a duty only to the value ad-
ded in Mexico, and not to the U.S.-source content.'5
The maquiladora program was originally conceived in Cus-
toms Code interpretations by the Mexican Secretaries of Com-
merce and Treasury in 1965.16 The maquiladora industry has
been economically successful since its conception, and has espe-
cially thrived in the past ten years. Much of the industry's re-
cent success can be attributed to the Mexican economy's shift
toward export-oriented manufacturing during the late 1970s and
early 1980s.17 Several presidential decrees have modified the na-
ture, scope, and objectives of the maquiladora program.' The
1989 Decree, currently in effect, emphasizes the following objec-
tives: generating employment and attracting foreign currency,
fostering regional development and industrial decentralization,
and facilitating the transfer and development of technology.19
B. FUTURE OF THE PROGRAM
As NAFTA eliminates tariffs and foreign ownership restric-
tions,20 American owned manufacturing plants in Mexico will
H. McKeith, The Environment and Free Trade: Meeting Halfway at the Mexi-
can Border, 10 PAC. BASIN L.J. 183, 185 (1991). Due to the bond requirement,
the maquiladora industry is often referred to as Mexico's "In-Bond Industry."
15. 19 U.S.C. § 1202 (item numbers 806.30 and 807.00). Item Number 807.00
provides that tariffs are to be assessed in accordance with "the full value of the
imported articles less the cost or value of such products of the U.S.." Id. Value
added typically consists of labor, rent, utilities, and any additional raw materi-
als. Schechter & Brill, supra note 9, at 699 n.5.
16. Schechter & Brill, supra note 9, at 701. The original program focused
specifically on border development. It required that a Mexican company be
formed to operate individual plants, but allowed full ownership of the Mexican
corporation by foreigners. Id, at 702.
17. During this period, Mexico experienced an economic crises precipitated
by an extreme drop in the international oil market. Realizing that it could no
longer depend on oil exports as the primary source of foreign currency, Mexico
encouraged greater integration of the maquiladora industry into its national
economy. The ensuing reconstruction of the Mexican economy resulted in the
expansion of manufacturing for export. Id. at 698.
18. Id. at 702-04. Since the original 1965 decree, the maquiladora program
has been modified by additional decrees in 1972 (eliminating geographic limita-
tions), 1977 (expanding the program's application by altering national content
restrictions), 1983 (encouraging greater integration into the national economy),
and 1989 (facilitating the development of a domestic supplier and subcontractor
network). Id.
19. Decreto para el Fomento y Operaci6n de la Industria Maquiladora de
Exportaci6n, D.O., Dec. 20, 1989, cited in Schechter & Brill, supra note 9, at 704
n.36.
20. NAFTA provides for the elimination of customs duties in Article
302(2), and for equal treatment of foreign investment in Article 1102.
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no longer benefit from the duty-free importation of raw materi-
als that is accorded by the maquiladora program.2 1 The tariff
phase-out period for NAFTA will be gradual, however, with full
duty elimination for certain tariff items scheduled as late as Jan-
uary 1, 2008.22 During the initial periods of tariff elimination, it
will be profitable for maquiladora owners to continue to take
advantage of the reduced tariff rates charged when re-importing
finished products into the United States. As a result, the maqui-
ladora program will remain advantageous to transnational com-
panies for a number of years. This will be true so long as the
duties charged on value added remain lower than the duties pre-
scribed by the NAFTA's phase-out schedule.
After tariffs are completely phased-out, the foreign manu-
facturing industry in Mexico is likely to continue to expand as
more companies move production facilities to Mexico.23 The
economic incentives for American manufacturers to locate in
Mexico will endure so long as Mexican labor remains relatively
inexpensive.
C. THE MAQUILADORA PROBLEM
Recently, the maquiladora industry has received substantial
attention from environmentalists because the border area,
where most maquiladoras are located, has been plagued by envi-
ronmental problems.24 The illegal disposal of hazardous waste
21. In addition to American owned maquiladoras, there are a significant
number of Japanese, Korean, Taiwanese, and German owned maquiladoras.
NAFTA will have no direct effect on the maquiladora program as it relates to
these and other non-party maquiladoras. Telephone Interview with Jaime
Palafox, Assistant of the Environmental Office of the Embassy of Mexico,
Washington, D.C. (Oct. 22, 1992). Even if non-party maquiladora owners were
to reap incidental benefits from NAFTA Rules of Origin changes, ownership
and exportation requirements will remain the same. Id Because these restric-
tions will continue to exist for non-party maquiladoras, the full implementation
of NAFTA does not signal the end of the maquiladora program in Mexico.
22. NAFTA, Tariff Schedules, Phase-Out Schedule, Staging Category C15.
NAFTA provides for the gradual reduction and eventual phase-out of tariffs for
goods travelling between the United States, Mexico, and Canada. NAFTA ad-
dresses approximately 9,000 tariff items, with about 50% to be eliminated imme-
diately, 15% to be phased out over a five year period, and the remaining items to
be eliminated over a six to 15 year period. President Bush Announces NAFTA
Accord, but Labor, Others Promise Renewed Attack, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA)
1375 (Aug. 12, 1992).
23. Michael Scott Feeley & Elizabeth Knier, Environmental Considera-
tions of the Emerging United States-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, 2 DuKE J.
COMP. & INT'L L. 259, 276 (1992).
24. Among the environmental problems attributed to the maquiladora in-
dustry are steadily worsening air quality in the border region, and contamina-
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from maquiladoras has become commonplace,25 and has resulted
in dangerous living conditions in Mexican towns where maqui-
ladoras are located, and in American colonias.26 One commonly
cited horror story tells of large numbers of babies being born
with missing or incomplete brains near maquiladoras.27 This is
allegedly caused by mothers' consumption of untreated water
coming from sources near the maquiladoras.2 8
As many urban areas along the border developed rapidly,
centralized wastewater collection and treatment systems were
never built.29 This has resulted in the vast discharge of un-
treated or inadequately treated wastewater into rivers, canals,
arroyos,30 the Gulf of Mexico, and the Pacific Ocean.31 An
American Medical Association report, released in 1990, charac-
terized the border region as a "virtual cesspool and breeding
ground for infectious disease," and warned that "[u]ncontrolled
air and water pollution is rapidly deteriorating and seriously af-
fecting the health and future economic vitality on both sides of
tion of water supplies due to improper and illegal disposal of hazardous wastes.
Id. at 274-75.
25. See, e.g., U.S.-Mexico Border: Thousands of Hazardous Waste Drums
Prompt Investigation, 15 Int'l Envtl. Rep. (BNA) 569 (Sept. 9, 1992).
26. Colonias are small American border towns located immediately across
the border from maquiladoras. Because environmental conditions in most
colonias are as poor as those across the border in Mexico, these conditions con-
stitute a significant part of the maquiladora problem.
27. Special Report: North American Free Trade Agreement Greeted with
Suspicion by Environmental Groups, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) Sept. 10, 1992, at
*29-30, available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database [hereinafter BNA NAFTA
Report]. This phenomenon is known as anencephaly, and has been occurring
with alarming frequency in Matamoros, Tamaulipas and Brownsville, Texas.
Non-environmental Causes Investigated in Anencephaly Outbreak on Border,
Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) Oct. 15,1992, at *2, available in WESTLAW, BNA-IED
Database [hereinafter BNA Anencephaly Report].
28. Lawyers Say Otpposition to Fast Track Mounts in U.S. Congress, NO-
TIMEX Mexican News Service, May 10, 1992, at *3, available in LEXIS, Nexis
Library, Omni File. This is only a theory, however, and studies to detect non-
environmental causes of the anencephaly outbreak are currently being con-
ducted. BNA Anencephaly Report, supra note 27, at *2.
29. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 11. Currently, Mexico's
urban areas (particularly those along the border) lack adequate sewage systems,
waste disposal facilities, pollution control equipment, and other basic structural
components. Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at 272.
30. An arroyo is a small stream, or brook.
31. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 12. While much of this
pollution may be attributed directly to the border plants themselves, a signifi-
cant portion may be attributed only indirectly, as the results of the rapid urban-
ization that has accompanied the growth of the maquiladora industry. "Waste
... generated by humans is a formidable component of the pollution stream."
Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at 273.
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the border. ' 32 In addition, industrial facilities, most of which are
maquiladoras, currently release a range of toxic air pollutants
into the atmosphere, further contributing to deteriorating air
quality along the border.33
The environmental problems among the maquiladoras can
be attributed to several causes such as non-compliance with ex-
isting environmental regulations, s4 lax enforcement by Mexican
authorities,35 and the lack of an adequate infrastructure neces-
sary to treat and dispose of hazardous waste3s While these
problems are complex and diverse, they can all be traced to a
common source: the lack of economic resources available in
Mexico to adequately control the environmental effects of devel-
opment in the border region.3 7
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND AND REGULATORY
SCHEME
A comprehensive environmental regulatory structure exists
in Mexico in the form of domestic laws, agency regulation, and
international agreements. As serious as the maquiladora prob-
lem is, it does not result from a lack of regulation. The Mexican
government has particularly shown an increasing commitment
to the environment in the past ten years.
A. THE GENERAL LAW OF ECOLOGICAL EQUILIBRIUM AND
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION
The General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environ-
32. Michael Satchell, Poisoning the Border, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT,
May 6, 1991, at 34, cited in Michael Conner, Maquiladoras and the Border Envi-
ronment Prospects for Moving from Agreements to Solutions, 3 COLO. J. INT'L
ENVTL. L. & POL'Y 683, 683 (1992).
33. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 12. The air quality
problems along the border can also be attributed to a number of other factors in
addition to the maquiladoras. The sister cities are subject to many of the same
air quality problems typical of densely populated urban areas. Id.
34. Strong environmental laws and adequate enforcement are necessary to
prevent companies from migrating to Mexico to avoid environmental compli-
ance costs. NAFTA: Reilley Says NAFTA May Be First Trade Pact with Sus-
tainable Development as a Goal, 9 Int'l Trade Rep. (BNA) 1386 (Aug. 13, 1992).
35. Id.
36. NAFTA May Bring 'Import' of Pollution to Mexico, J. Com. (Reuter)
Aug. 20, 1992, at *2, available in WESTLAW, JOC Database.
37. "Lack of funding is the root of Mexican and United States environmen-
tal concerns." Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at 292. See also Conner, supra
note 32, at 699.
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mental Protection (the General Ecology Law),31 passed in 1988,
is a comprehensive environmental law that provides the primary
structure of environmental regulation and enforcement in Mex-
ico. 39 The law is patterned after U.S. environmental legislation
in both substance and structure, and is effectuated through a de-
centralized system in which local authorities have the responsi-
bility to ensure compliance. 40 The General Ecology Law
regulates air, water, soil, and natural resources; requires prior
authorization for any activity that causes ecological dise-
quilibrium; and is enforced through a series of technical ecologi-
cal norms.41
Preventing and controlling water, air, and soil pollution is a
fundamental goal of the General Ecology Law,42 and this makes
it particularly relevant to problems in the border region and
among the maquiladoras. This law requires each facility to com-
ply with a variety of guidelines regarding the generation, stor-
age, transportation and disposal of hazardous waste.43 In
particular, it requires that all hazardous waste generated by ma-
quiladoras be returned to the country of origin.44
38. General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection,
D.O. Jan. 28, 1988 cited in Conner, supra note 32, at 691 n.54.
39. UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CHAIR-
MAN, COMMITTEE ON COMMERCE, SCIENCE, AND TRANSPORTATION, U.S. SENATE,
U.S.-MExICO TRADE: ASSESSMENT OF MEXICO'S ENVIRONMENTAL CONTROLS
FOR NEW COMPAINES 2 (Aug. 1992) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
40. Edward M. Ranger, Jr., Environmental Regulation and Enforcement
in Mexico, at 2, reprinted from Maquiladora Industry Annual Review (Seguros
de Mexico 1991) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade). The
General Ecology Law itself is federal in scope, with federal authorities empow-
ered to apply and enforce regulations. The intent, however, is to rely on local
authorities to monitor compliance. In addition, the General Ecology Law allows
state and municipal regulations to exist within its field of application. Id.
41. BNA Environmental Provisions, supra note 10, at 245.
42. Other fundamental goals include the prevention of the over-exploita-
tion of non-renewable resources, and the prevention of noise, vibration, and
thermal pollution. EMBASSY OF MEXICO, MEXICO ENVIRONMENTAL ISSUES -
FACT SHEETS 9 (Sept. 1992) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global
Trade).
43. McKeith, supra note 14, at 189-92. These requirements mandate that
each facility: (1) obtain an environmental operating license; (2) file an Environ-
mental Impact Statement (if one is required); (3) register residual wastewater
discharge; (4) register the generation of hazardous waste; (5) obtain Ecological
Manifests (tracking forms) for the transportation of hazardous materials; (6)
store hazardous materials in approved facilities; and (7) follow a series of re-
porting and record-keeping requirements. Id.
44. Conner, supra note 32, at 692. This requirement is also referred to in




The General Ecology Law of 1988 delegates the responsibil-
ity for the formulation and enforcement of environmental policy
to the recently created Secretariat of Social Development
(SEDESOL). 45 The Mexican Congress approved the creation of
SEDESOL in May 1992 as part of an initiative to concentrate the
responsibilities of several social institutions in one agency.46 In
addition to policymaking, monitoring, and enforcement,
SEDESOL performs administrative functions such as channel-
ing funds for the development of infrastructure projects.47
Two agencies which focus exclusively on the environment
fall under SEDESOL's authority.48 The National Institute of
Ecology is primarily responsible for analyzing and formulating
Mexico's environmental policy. 49 The Office of the Attorney
General for Protection of the Environment is responsible for the
enforcement of environmental regulations formulated by the
National Institute of Ecology, the investigation and punishment
of non-compliance with environmental regulations, and the fa-
cilitation of public participation in environmental measures.5°
SEDESOL grants these agencies a degree of technical and opera-
tive autonomy to aid them in fulfilling their functions.51
The General Ecology Law requires prospective owners and
operators of new companies, or existing companies planning sig-
nificant changes, to receive advance authorization from
SEDESOL. Authorization is obtained first by submitting a
45. Originally, this responsibility was given to the Secretariat of Urban De-
velopment and Ecology (SEDUE). On May 26, 1992, however, SEDESOL was
formed with the intent that it perform all environmental functions previously
handled by SEDUE. GAO REPORT, supra note 39, at 2. SEDESOL has now
completely replaced SEDUE.
46. SECRETARIA DE DESARROLLO SocIAL, SEDESOL 1 (1992) (pamphlet on
file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade) [hereinafter SEDESOL Pam-
phlet]. This reorganization was the result of an initiative by the Federal Execu-
tive. Id.
47. GAO REPORT, supra note 39, at 2.
48. EMBASSY OF MEXICO, SEDESOL's FIRST 100 DAYS: A RECORD OF ENVi-
RONMENTAL ENFORCEMENT 1 (1992) (pamphlet distributed by the Embassy of
Mexico) [hereinafter SEDESOL's FIRST 100 DAYS].
49. Id. These responsibilities fall within the categories of ecological plan-
ning, environmental standards, ecological exploitation of natural resources, and
technological research and development. SEDESOL Pamphlet, supra note 46,
at 2.
50. SEDESOL's FIRST 100 DAYS, supra note 48, at 1.
51. SEDESOL Pamphlet, supra note 46, at 2. This type of autonomy serves
the purpose of preventing bureaucratic stagnation, political corruption, and
other potential problems associated with the political capture of government
agencies.
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"Dictamen de Viabilidad" (feasibility assessment),5 2 and then
submitting an Environmental Impact Appraisal (EIA) if
SEDESOL determines that the project's environmental risk
warrants one. 53 If an EIA is required, it must be conducted by a
registered environmental consultant.54
Maquiladoras are also specifically regulated by the Secreta-
riat of Commerce and Industrial Promotion (SECOFI), a coordi-
nating agency for the maquiladora program. SECOFI is
responsible for ensuring that maquiladoras initiate the EIA pro-
cess and comply with other SEDESOL requirements.5 5 In order
to participate in the maquiladora program, a company must re-
ceive a license from SECOFI.56 This license is conditioned upon
compliance with applicable environmental legislation.5 7
C. THE LA PAZ AGREEMENT
In addition to traditional forms of regulation by domestic
legislation and agency supervision, the maquiladora industry is
significantly affected by international environmental agree-
ments. The most important of these, the Agreement Between
the United States of America and the United Mexican States on
Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the Envi-
ronment in the Border Area 8 (the La Paz Agreement) was
signed by President Ronald Reagan and President Miguel de la
Madrid on August 14, 1983, in the City of La Paz, Baja Califor-
nia, Mexico. This agreement sets forth general goals for envi-
ronmental protection along the border and provides a
foundation for the cooperative fulfillment of those goals. In the
La Paz Agreement, the "border area" is defined as any territory
52. A Dictamen de Viabilidad is a summary describing the planned location
and operation of the company. GAO REPORT, supra note 39, at 11.
53. This determination is based upon information contained in the
Dictamen de Viabilidad. Id If SEDESOL determines that a project will not
substantially affect the environment, the company will be requested to submit
an "Informe Preventivo" (preventative report). I&
54. McKeith, supra note 14, at 190.
55. GAO REPORT, supra note 39, at 12.
56. To obtain this license, the company must provide SECOFI with a copy
of the EIA, Dictamen de Viabilidad, or Informe Preventivo with a stamp show-
ing that it has been received by SEDESOL. This ensures that a license will not
be issued without initiating SEDESOL's authorization procedures. Id
57. Environmental Regulation and Enforcement in Mexico, supra note 40,
at 6.
58. Agreement Between the United States of America and the United
Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement of the En-
vironment in the Border Area, Aug. 14, 1983, U.S.-Mex., T.I.A.S. No. 10827, re-
printed in 22 I.L.M. 1025 (1983) [hereinafter La Paz Agreement].
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within 100 kilometers of the inland and maritime boundaries be-
tween the United States and Mexico.59
The provisions of the La Paz Agreement are general in na-
ture and primarily outline the administration of cooperative ef-
forts. Article 8 designates the Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) as the national coordinator for the United States,
and SEDESOL as the national coordinator for Mexico.60 As na-
tional coordinators, these agencies have the responsibility to "co-
ordinate and monitor implementation of this agreement, make
recommendations to the Parties, and organize the annual
meetings."'61
Specific arrangements for the solutions of environmental
problems are to be added to the La Paz Agreement through for-
mal annexes as the need arises.62 To date, the agreement has
been supplemented with five annexes relating to specific
problems.
Annex I, Agreement of Cooperation for Solution of the Bor-
der Sanitation Problem at San Diego, California - Tijuana, Baja
California, was signed on July 18, 1985.63 This Annex addresses
sanitation problems at the border between San Diego and Ti-
juana, and provides for consultations between the U.S. and Mex-
ican governments regarding a proposed waste-water treatment
facility.64
Annex II, Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Pollution
of the Environment Along the Inland International Boundary
by Discharges of Hazardous Substances, was also signed on July
59. Id. art. 4.
60. Id. art. 8. The agreement actually designates SEDUE as the Mexican
National Coordinator, but SEDESOL has since taken over all functions of
SEDUE. See supra note 45.
61. Id. art. 8. Additional responsibilities are to be determined by agree-
ment in subsequent annexes to the La Paz Agreement. Id.
62. 1d art. 3, which states as follows: "Pursuant to this Agreement, the
Parties may conclude specific arrangements for the solution of common
problems in the border area, which may be annexed thereto. Similarly, the
Parties may also agree upon annexes to this Agreement on technical matters."
63. Annex I to the Agreement Between the United States of America and
the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement
of the Environment in the Border Area - Agreement of Cooperation for Solu-
tion of the Border Sanitation Problem at San Diego, California-Tijuana, Baja
California, July 18, 1985, U.S.-Mex., 26 I.L.M. 18 (1987) [hereinafter Annex I].
64. This treatment facility has only recently received U.S. funding ap-
proval. A proposed bill provides $32.5 million for its construction in 1992. EPA,
Congress Sends EPA Funding Bill to the President Hill Aide Says, Daily Rep.
for Execs. (BNA) Sept. 30, 1992, at *7, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni
File.
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18, 1985.65 This annex provides working definitions of the con-
cepts of "polluting incidents," "environment" and "hazardous
substances."6 6 It establishes a "Joint Contingency Plan" to deal
with polluting incidents, 67 and a "Joint Response Team" to ad-
vise, evaluate, and make recommendations regarding specific
polluting incidents.6 8 The goal of this annex is to improve detec-
tion and response measures to polluting incidents.69
65. Annex II to the Agreement Between the United States of America and
the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement
of the Environment in the Border Area - Agreement Between the United
States of America and the United Mexican States Regarding Pollution of the
Environment Along the Inland International Boundary by Discharges of Haz-
ardous Substances, July 18,1985, U.S.-Mex., 26 I.L.M. 19 (1987) [hereinafter An-
nex II].
66. Id art. I provides in pertinent part:
For the purposes of this Agreement:
(a) "A polluting incident" means a discharge or the threat of a dis-
charge of any hazardous substance on one side of the inland interna-
tional boundary of a magnitude which causes, or threatens to cause
imminent and substantial adverse effects on the public health, welfare,
or the environment.
(b) "Environment" means the atmosphere, land, and surface and
ground water, including the natural resources therein, such as fish,
wildlife, forests, crop and rangeland, rivers, streams, aquifers and all
other components of the ecosystem.
(c) "Hazardous substances" means elements and compounds which if
discharged present or may present an imminent and substantial danger
to the public health, welfare or the environment according to the laws
of each party and the determination of the Joint Response Team
(JRT). The JRT and its responsibilities are defined in Appendix II.
67. The purpose of this plan is to devise workable cooperative measures to
effectively respond to polluting incidents. Id. art. II.
68. Id. art. II, appendix II, 2.6 provides in pertinent part:
When the two Parties have agreed to initiate a joint response to a pol-
luting incident, the functions and responsibilities of the JRT will be
the following-
(a) Based on the OSC's ['on scene coordinator'] initial notification, ad-
vise the OSC ... about measures needed to respond to the incident and
what resources . . . are available to carry out those measures.
(b) To evaluate and make recommendations concerning the measures
taken by the OSC.
(c) To provide continuing advice to the OSC.
(d) To consider the journal and reports of the OSC and recommend
to the National Coordinators improvements needed in the Plan.
(e) Based on the reports of the OSC, to assess the possible impacts of
the polluting incident and to recommend measures necessary to miti-
gate the adverse effects of such incident.
(f) To take measures to coordinate and use to the maximum the re-
sources which agencies or persons of the United States of America, or
of the United Mexican States, or of a third party can contribute.
69. McKeith, supra note 14, at 193. Annex II is particularly relevant to the
regulation of maquiladoras because certain incidents of illegal disposal or acci-
dental discharge of hazardous wastes by maquiladoras in the border area qualify
as "polluting incidents" within the meaning of this Annex.
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Annex III, Agreement of Cooperation Regarding the Trans-
boundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Sub-
stances, was signed on November 12, 1986.70 This annex
provides a legal and procedural framework for the transborder
shipment of hazardous substances, and monitors and regulates
these shipments in a manner designed not to interfere with bi-
lateral trade. 71 Specifically, it provides for notifications regard-
ing the shipment of hazardous substances, 72 and notifications
regarding restrictive regulatory actions.73 Maquiladoras are spe-
cifically addressed in Article XI, which provides that
"[h]azardous waste generated in the processes of economic pro-
duction, manufacturing, processing or repair, for which raw
materials were utilized and temporarily admitted, shall continue
to be readmitted by the country of origin of the raw materials in
accordance with applicable national policies, laws and
regulations. '74
Annex IV, Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Trans-
boundary Air Pollution Caused by Copper Smelters Along [the]
Common Border, was signed on January 29, 1987.75 This annex
70. Annex III to the Agreement Between the United States of America
and the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improve-
ment of the Environment in the Border Area - Agreement of Cooperation
Between the United States of America and the United Mexican States Regard-
ing the Transboundary Shipments of Hazardous Wastes and Hazardous Sub-
stances, Nov. 12, 1986, U.S.-Mex., 26 I.L.M. 25 (1987) [hereinafter Annex III].
71. Environmental Regulation and Enforcement in Mexico, supra note 40,
at 7. Annex III is the only part of the La Paz Agreement that expressly links
environmental regulation with trade obligations. In its preamble, Annex III
recognizes that "the close trading relationship and the long common border be-
tween the Parties make it necessary to cooperate regarding transboundary ship-
ments of hazardous waste and hazardous substances without unreasonably
affecting the trade of goods and services." Annex III, supra note 70.
72. Annex III, supra note 70, art. VI. This notification contains the name
of the hazardous substance, the approximate date(s) of export, information re-
garding regulatory action, and the name and address of the contact point. Id
art. VI, 3.
73. Id, art. V. This notification contains the name of the substance that has
been regulated, a summary of the regulatory action, a summary of the reason
for the regulatory action, information regarding any alternative substances, and
the name and address of the contact point. Id. art. V: 2.
74. Id. art. XI. Because Annex III, Article XI addresses readmission into
the country of origin of raw materials, rather than shipment from the maqui-
ladoras, it is unclear whether it mandates that all hazardous wastes from ma-
quiladoras be returned to the country of origin. The maquiladoras themselves
had not taken this as a mandate. Conner, supra note 32, at 689-90. The General
Ecology Law, however, has subsequently clarified this ambiguity by expressly
requiring that each plant return all hazardous wastes to the country in which
the materials originated. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
75. Annex IV to the Agreement Between the United States of America and
1993"1
MiNN. J GLOBAL TRADE
limits sulphur dioxide emissions of specific smelters,76 and coor-
dinates a monitoring, recordkeeping and reporting system for
the smelters.77
Annex V, Agreement of Cooperation Regarding Interna-
tional Transport of Urban Air Pollution, was signed on October
3, 1989.78 This annex calls for each party to initiate studies to
identify and manage emissions of pollutants from specific statio-
nary sources. 79 In addition, Annex V calls on each party to
jointly explore ways to harmonize air pollution control stan-
dards and ambient air quality standards.8 0
In Mexico, the La Paz Agreement has been ineffective in
improving the monitoring and enforcement of regulations gov-
erning the disposal of hazardous wastes. Despite the regulatory
scheme outlined in Annex III, Mexico has made little headway
in pursuance of this goal.81 A major reason for this lack of pro-
gress is the deficiency of tracking procedures.8 2 A common prac-
the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement
of the Environment in the Border Area - Agreement of Cooperation Between
the United States of America and the United Mexican States Regarding Trans-
boundary Air Pollution Caused by Copper Smelters Along Their Common Bor-
der, July 29, 1987, U.S.-Mex., 26 I.L.M. 33 (1987) [hereinafter Annex IV]. As a
remedial measure aimed at two specific copper smelters, Annex IV has no regu-
latory effect on the maquiladora industry.
76. The smelters are the Phelps Dodge copper smelter in Douglas, Arizona
and the Mexicana de Cobre la Caridad copper smelter in Nacozari, Sonora. Id.
art. 1(1),(3).
77. Id. art. II.
78. Annex V to the Agreement Between the United States of America and
the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection and Improvement
of the Environment in the Border Area - Agreement of Cooperation Between
the Government of the United States of America and the Government of the
United Mexican States Regarding International Transport of Urban Air Pollu-
tion, Oct. 3, 1989, U.S.-Mex., 29 I.L.M. 29 (1990) [hereinafter Annex V]. Annex
V may ultimately have a great deal of effect on the maquiladora industry, be-
cause maquiladoras are the type of emission sources that the Annex addresses.
Id.
79. Id Article II outlines the general obligations of each party to identify
the location, magnitude and type of pollutants in their respective territories.
Articles III and IV create obligations regarding the compiling of information
and monitoring of emissions.
80. Id. art. V provides in pertinent part: "In order to make more effective
the implementation of this Annex, the Parties shall jointly explore ways to har-
monize, as appropriate, their air pollution control standards and ambient air
quality standards in accordance with their respective legal procedures."
81. Elizabeth C. Rose, Transboundary Harm: Hazardous Waste Manage-
ment Problems and Mexico's Maquiladoras, 23 INT'L LAw. 223, 240 (1989).
82. After raw materials are initially shipped from the United States, prov-
ing that they reach their proper destination and that the wastes subsequently
generated are properly managed is virtually impossible. Id at 241.
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tice of local waste disposal companies has been to simply remove
waste-filled drums from maquiladoras and dump them into mu-
nicipal or private landfills, or directly into urban sewage sys-
tems. 3 One particularly horrifying report alleges that recycled
hazardous waste drums are being sold to Mexican citizens, who
use them for the storage of drinking water.84
While the La Paz Agreement and its annexes have ad-
dressed a significant number of environmental problems in the
border area, they have also been criticized for their failure to
effectively deter maquiladoras from blatantly disregarding envi-
ronmental regulations8s In response to this criticism, EPA offi-
cials have pointed to insufficient funding. 86 A second deficiency
with the La Paz Agreement is the conspicuous absence of en-
forcement provisions. While the goals of the agreement are am-
bitious, its terms are often qualified with language such as "to
the fullest extent practical."87 In addition, the agreement ex-
plicitly states that "[a]ctivities under this agreement shall be
subject to the availability of funds and other resources to each
Party and to the applicable laws and regulations in each coun-
try. '8 8 These passages indicate that the La Paz Agreement is
merely a cooperative attempt to solve environmental problems,
and has little binding force. As the continued existence of the
maquiladora problem demonstrates, the La Paz Agreement and
its annexes are a disappointing precedent among cooperative en-
vironmental efforts between the United States and Mexico.
III. NAFTA AS A SOLUTION TO THE MAQUILADORA
PROBLEM
During preliminary negotiations leading up to NAFTA, en-
83. H. Jeffrey Leonard, Confronting Industrial Pollution in Rapidly In-
dustrializing Countries: Myths, Pitfalls and Opportunities, 12 ECOLOGY L.Q.
779, 799 (1985). Few company officials candidly admit that this type of disposal
occurs. Most of these companies, however, are unable to account for the final
destinations of waste drums that are taken from their plants. Id.
84. Jane Juffer, Dump at the Border, PROGRFSSIVE, Oct. 1988, at 24, 28.
85. McKeith, supra note 14, at 194. In addition, the practical effectiveness
of the La Paz Agreement and its Annexes has been the subject of doubt. Id.
n.50.
86. This response came from Enrique Manzanilla, U.S.-Mexico Border Co-
ordinator, Water Management Division, EPA Region IX, and is cited in Mc-
Keith, supra note 14, at 194.
87. See, for example, La Paz Agreement, Article 2: "The Parties under-
take, to the fullest extent practical, to adopt the appropriate measures to pre-
vent, reduce and eliminate sources of pollution...." La Paz Agreement, supra
note 58, art. 2 (emphasis added).
88. Id. art. 18.
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vironmentalists hoped that the agreement would directly ad-
dress the maquiladora problem.8 9  In particular,
environmentalists had hoped that NAFTA would consider lax
environmental regulations and enforcement to be unfair trade
practices, and provide enforcement mechanisms to compel a
party to take measures to protect the environment. 90
Two concerns explain the interest of the U.S. government
and American citizens in compelling Mexico to protect and im-
prove its domestic environmental conditions. The first concern
is economic - U.S. business interests have expressed concern that
manufacturers will relocate to Mexico in order to avoid high
compliance costs with domestic environmental regulations.91 If
lower environmental compliance costs actually do play a role in
decisions to relocate, 92 encouraging investment through non-en-
forcement of environmental regulations may constitute an un-
fair trade advantage for Mexico. 93
89. Even after NAFTA has been signed, the governments of the United
States, Mexico, and Canada continue to receive criticism for the perceived fail-
ure to consult environmental organizations during NAFTA negotiations.
NAFTA - Mexican Groups Gear up for Talks on Environmental Issues Related
to Pact, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA), Feb. 23, 1993, at *9, available in WESTLAW,
BNA-IED Database.
90. AMERIcAN CETACEAN SOCIETY, ET AL., RESPONSE OF ENVIRONMENTAL
AND CONSUMER ORGANIZATIONS TO THE SEPTEhMER 6, 1992 TEXT OF NAFTA 4
(Alex Hittle & Scott Nilson eds., Oct. 6, 1992) [hereinafter ENVIRONMENTAL
REPORT].
91. NAFTA Provides Wrong Business Incentives, Witnesses Tell House
Small Business Panel, Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) Sept. 22, 1992, at *18-19, avail-
able in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database.
92. There is considerable disagreement as to whether or not environmental
compliance costs are high enough to become an influential factor in a company's
decision to relocate. Id. According to the Bush Administration summary of
NAFTA:
Compliance costs play a minimal role in relocation decisions because
they represent a small share of total costs for most industries. Indeed,
86 percent of U.S. industries have abatement costs of 2 percent or less.
Moreover, most U.S. industries with high compliance costs already
have low tariffs, so NAFTA would give them little incentive to relocate
to Mexico.
UNITED STATES TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, DESCRIPTION OF THE NORTH AMERI-
CAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT, (Aug. 12, 1992) [hereinafter NAFTA Summary].
Even if compliance costs are not high enough to influence an existing man-
ufacturer's decision to relocate, however, they may be significant enough to in-
fluence the decision of where a new manufacturing plant should be located. If
this is true, a trade advantage exists for countries that do not enforce environ-
mental regulations.
93. Industries in developed countries have commonly complained that they
are at a disadvantage when competing with industries with less stringent envi-
ronmental regulations. Geoffrey W. Levin, The Environment and Trade - A
Multilateral Imperative, 1 MINN. J. GLOBAL TRADE 231, 234 (1992).
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The second concern is environmental - beyond the imme-
diate concern that environmentally dangerous conditions at the
border will spill over into the United States, modern environ-
mental theory has a global rather than a national focus. As a
concept, environmentalism transcends national boundaries. Ac-
cordingly, environmentalists throughout the world are as con-
cerned about environmental problems in Mexico as they are
about those in the United States.94 If the Mexican government
is unwilling or unable to protect the environment within its own
territory, public and private environmental organizations will
naturally look elsewhere to find solutions to environmental
problems. If, under NAFTA, the U.S. government has the
power to compel action by Mexican authorities, environmental-
ists will certainly pressure it to do so.95
Although NAFTA does not go this far, it does recognize en-
vironmental concerns in several provisions. NAFTA has been
hailed by the Bush Administration as "the greenest ever" among
free trade agreements.96 This is not a very strong statement,
however, given that previous trade agreements have rarely ad-
dressed environmental issues.97 In fact, the nature of NAFTA's
environmental provisions is limited, and NAFTA offers little
that will lead to solutions to the maquiladora problem.
A. ARTICULATED GOALS
The preamble of NAFTA, which lists the general results
94. Because environmental problems are oblivious to national boundaries,
it matters little whether the environmental problems caused by the maqui-
ladoras are in Mexico or the United States. "Nature's writs are ubiquitous and
universal. The laws of Nature give rise to identical bio-physical reactions in Los
Angeles, Birmingham, Dusseldorf, Oslo, or Auckland. When discharges of
wastes or residuals lead to pollution, common bio-physical reactions take place
regardless of where in the world the environment is abused." Lakshman
Guruswamy, Integrating Pollution Controk The Way Forward, 7 ARiz. J. INT'L
& CoMP. L. 173, 185 (1990).
95. When environmental protection is at stake, it matters little to environ-
mental organizations what the source of that protection may be. Throughout
the NAFTA negotiations, for example, environmental organizations pressured
the Bush Administration to include provisions that would affect environmental
conditions within Mexico. See, e.g., NAFTA - Public Citizen Says NAFTA Sum-
mary is 'Little More Than Greenwash', Int'l Trade Daily (BNA) Aug. 24, 1992,
at *15, available in WESTLAW, BNA-BTD Database.
96. Linda Fisher, EPA Assistant Administrator for Prevention, Pesticides,
and Toxic Substances, described NAFTA as "perhaps the greenest trade agree-
ment ever negotiated in the world." NAFTA: U.S.-Mexico Environmental Ac-
cord Expected to Be Signed Soon, Fisher Says, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) Sept. 14,
1992, at *9, available in WESTLAW, BNA-IED Database.
97. ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 1.
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that the parties to the agreement hope to achieve, contains spe-
cific references to environmental safety. These references in-
clude the resolve to:
-"UNDERTAKE each of the [other goals] in a manner consis-
tent with environmental protection and conservation";
-"PROMOTE sustainable development"; and
-"STRENGTHEN the development and enforcement of environ-
mental laws and regulations."98s
As declarations in a preamble, these provisions are merely
general statements and have little, if any, regulatory force.9
NAFTA supporters have consistently referred to these state-
ments, however, as reflecting a strong commitment to environ-
mental safety.1°° Whether or not such a commitment exists, its
existence does not necessarily mean that affirmative steps will
be taken to realize articulated goals.
B. REINFORCEMENT OF EXISTING AGREEMENTS
Article 104 of NAFTA lists certain currently existing inter-
national environmental agreements that will take precedence
over NAFTA should a conflict between NAFTA and the provi-
sions of the respective agreements arise. 10' The agreements that
may affect the maquiladoras include:
1) The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the
Ozone Layer, 02
2) The Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary
Movements of Hazardous Wastes and Their Disposal, 03 and
98. NAFTA, pmbl.
99. Although statements in a preamble are not normally binding, they do
have a degree of interpretive force. According to Art. 31 of the Vienna Conven-
tion on the Law of Treaties, the preamble of a treaty is relevant in determining
the context and purpose of the agreement should a dispute regarding the inter-
pretation of terms arise. Vienna Conventions on the Law of Treaties, art. 31,
U.N. Doc. A/Conf.39/27, May 23, 1969.
100. See, for example, NAFTA Summary, supra note 92, at 44: "The three
NAFTA countries have committed in the NAFTA to implementing the Agree-
ment in a manner consistent with environmental protection and to promoting
sustainable development. Specific provisions throughout the Agreement build
upon these commitments."
101. NAFTA, art. 104.
102. Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, Sept.
16, 1987, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1541 (entered into force Jan. 1, 1989) [hereinaf-
ter Montreal Protocol]. This agreement establishes specific obligations to limit
the use of chlorofluorocarbons and other chemicals that deplete the ozone
layer. It affects the maquiladoras only indirectly, in that it limits the manufac-
ture of certain substances.
103. Basel Convention on the Control of Transboundary Movements of Haz-
ardous Wastes and Their Disposal, Mar. 22, 1989, UNEP Doc. IG 80/3, 28 I.L.M.
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3) The Agreement Between the United States of America and
the United Mexican States on Cooperation for the Protection
and Improvement of the Environment in the Border Area (The
La Paz Agreement).'i 4
Although it allows these agreements to remain undisturbed
as part of the environmental regulatory scheme that applies to
the maquiladoras, 05 NAFTA incorporates few, if any of these
agreements' specific environmental obligations.'06 Incorpora-
tion of environmental obligations is important because it would
allow those obligations to be enforced under NAFTA. However,
because provisions of the environmental agreements that take
precedence over NAFTA are limited to "specific trade obliga-
tions" set forth in those agreements, 10 7 very few provisions will
be implicated. 08
C. INVESTMENT PROVISIONS
Chapter 11 of NAFTA contains the investment provisions
that will govern all foreign investment between the parties. Spe-
cifically, this chapter applies to measures adopted or maintained
by the government of a party, relating to investors and invest-
ments of another party. 0 9
NAFTA's investment provisions attempt to protect each
party's existing environmental regulations by allowing a country
657 (1989). This agreement creates obligations regarding the shipment of haz-
ardous wastes between countries. It is relevant to the maquiladoras because
maquiladoras are required to ship hazardous wastes back to the country of ori-
gin. See supra note 44 and accompanying text. The Basel Convention is of lim-
ited applicability with respect to incorporating environmental obligations under
NAFTA, however, because it allows individual countries to set their own envi-
ronmental standards and procedures regarding the shipment of wastes, rather
than creating multilateral standards. Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at 278.
104. See La Paz Agreement, supra note 58. Because this agreement already
directly regulates maquiladoras, obligations under this agreement are the most
relevant in this context.
105. The rest of the regulatory scheme is composed of Mexican law and par-
allel initiatives between the U.S. and Mexican governments. See supra part II.
See also infra part IV.
106. See infra part III.D.
107. NAFTA, art. 104(1).
108. Because the agreements listed in Article 104 of NAFTA are all environ-
mental agreements, they contain very few "specific trade obligations." The
Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer contains obliga-
tions to limit trade to non-parties to the agreement. Montreal Protocol, art. 4,
supra note 102, at 1554-55. This obligation is irrelevant with respect to the ma-
quiladora problem, however, because it addresses types of manufacturing,
rather than the conduct of manufacturers.
109. NAFTA, art. 1101, 1(a),(b).
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to impose any standard it deems appropriate, so long as those
standards are applied equally to domestically-owned enter-
prises.110 These provisions emphasize each country's right to
choose its own level of environmental protection without outside
interference."'
This chapter also echoes the general sentiments set forth in
the preamble by providing that a party may adopt, maintain, or
enforce any measure it considers appropriate to ensure that in-
vestment "is undertaken in a manner sensitive to environmental
concerns. 11 2 The generality of this statement, however, sug-
gests that this investment provision will probably have little
practical effect on environmental regulation and enforcement.
Finally, this chapter explicitly recognizes that "it is inappro-
priate to encourage investment by relaxing domestic... environ-
mental measures.""x l3 This language is weak, however, because
it merely states that parties should not waive standards to en-
courage or retain investment, not that they shall not do so. 1 4 If
a party believes that another party has relaxed standards to en-
courage investment, NAFTA provides no remedy apart from
consultations to resolve the dispute."l 5 If the dispute is not re-
solved through these consultations, it is unclear whether formal
(Chapter 20) dispute resolution procedures116 are available to
the complaining party in order to compel the offending party to
rectify the situation.117
110. NAFTA, arts. 1102(1) and 1106(2). These provisions are analogous to
the national treatment obligations contained in the General Agreement on Tar-
iffs and Trade (GATT), which provide, inter alia, that "[tihe products of the
territory of any contracting party... shall be accorded treatment no less favour-
able than that accorded to like products of national origin in respect of all laws,
regulations and requirements .. " General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
art. 111(4), opened for signature Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. pts 5,6, T.I.A.S. No. 1700,
55 U.N.T.S. 187 [hereinafter GA r].
111. NAFTA does not impose environmental standards, but only requires
that any domestic standard imposed by a party be applied in a non-discrimina-
tory manner. This right of self-determination is articulated by Article 904(1),
which asserts that: "[e]ach Party may, in accordance with this Agreement,
adopt, maintain and apply standards-related measures, including those relating
to . . . the environment . .. and measures to ensure their enforcement or
implementation."
112. NAFTA, art. 1114(1).
113. NAFrA, art. 1114(2).
114. Id. Article 1114(2) states in part: "A Party should not waive or other-
wise derogate from ... such measures as an encouragement for the establish-
ment, acquisition, expansion, or retention in its territory of an investment."
115. Id.
116. See infra part III.D.
117. See infra note 157 and accompanying text.
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While Chapter 11 directly addresses potential environmen-
tal problems that NAFTA may create or amplify, it does not go
far enough to assuage the worst fears of NAFTA's environmen-
tal critics. The most immediate environmental problem along
the border today is the lax enforcement of existing laws, rather
than the lowering of standards to attract investment.118 More-
over, the non-obligatory nature of the language of Chapter 11
environmental provisions" 9 may render it impossible to use
these provisions as the basis for a claim under NAFTA's dispute
resolution chapter. 120
D. DISPUTE RESOLUTION
At best, NAFTA's dispute resolution procedures provide
only a glimmer of hope for affirmative solutions to the maqui-
ladora problem. Theoretically, these procedures could serve as
an enforcement mechanism that would allow the United States
to compel Mexican enforcement of environmental regulation in
limited situations. Although the text itself makes no reference
to this type of use, the dispute resolution procedures in NAFTA
may be able to trigger provisions of other environmental agree-
ments which previously have been ineffective or unenforce-
able.121 If this actually happened, the merger of NAFTA with
these agreements would effectively produce a dynamic and en-
forceable - albeit limited - scheme of environmental regula-
tion among the United States, Mexico, and Canada.
Chapter 20 of NAFTA defines the institutions and proce-
dures to be utilized in resolving disputes among parties. These
procedures apply with respect to all disputes regarding the inter-
pretation or application of NAFTA, or "wherever a Party con-
siders that an actual or proposed measure of another party is or
would be inconsistent with the obligations of this agreement."' 22
To the extent that "obligations of this Agreement" include the
118. Although NAFTA Article 1114(2) addresses enforcement problems to a
limited degree, "[i]t misses the main current problem which is lax enforcement
of existing laws, rather than the lowering of standards to attract investment."
ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 4.
119. See supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text.
120. See infra text accompanying notes 150-51.
121. See supra part III.B. The La Paz Agreement and its annexes, for exam-
ple, contain specific environmental obligations, but they are legally unenforce-
able because the La Paz Agreement has no dispute resolution procedures or
enforcement provisions.
122. NAFTA, art. 2004.
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general propositions set forth in the preamble' 2 3 and the invest-
ment provisions, 124 and the obligations of the environmental
agreements that take precedence over NAFTA, dispute resolu-
tion procedures may be applied to environmental obligations
that are not explicitly stated in the text of NAFTA.
A complaining party initiates dispute resolution under
NAFTA by requesting consultations with another party regard-
ing the disputed measure.'2 5 The only requirement at this stage
is that "[t]he consulting Parties shall make every attempt to ar-
rive at a mutually satisfactory resolution of any matter through
consultations."'126
If the parties fail to resolve the dispute through consulta-
tions within a specified time period, any party may request a
meeting of the Free Trade Commission (the Commission).127 At
this meeting, the Commission may "call on such technical advis-
ers or create such working groups or expert groups as it deems
necessary."'12 At this stage, the only mandate is that the Com-
mission help the parties "to reach a mutually satisfactory resolu-
tion of the dispute."'2'
If the Commission does not resolve the matter within a
specified period of time, any party may request that the Com-
mission establish an arbitral panel.130 This panel consists of in-
dividuals appointed by a selection process in which each party
selects citizens of the other disputing party.'3 ' After hearing the
dispute, the panel submits a report to the disputing parties and
123. Generally, preambles of international agreements are relevant only to
matters of interpretation. See supra note 99.
124. See supra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
125. NAFTA, art. 2006(1).
126. Id. art. 2006(5).
127. Id. art. 2007(1). The Free Trade Commission is a board specifically cre-
ated to resolve disputes regarding the interpretation and application of NAFTA.
Id. art. 2001(2)(c). A meeting of the Commission may be requested under Art.
2007 only after consultations under Art. 2006 have taken place. Id. art. 2007(1).
128. Id. art. 2007(5)(a).
129. Id. art. 2007(5).
130. Id. art. 2008(1). The establishment of an arbitral panel may not be re-
quested unless the Commission has previously convened, and the matter has
not been resolved. Id.
131. Id. art. 2011(1)(c). The panel consists of one chair, and two panelists
from each country. Id. art. 2011(1). The chair is chosen by consensus of each
party. Id. art. 2011(1)(b). If the parties are unable to agree on a chair within a
specified time period, a disputing party chosen by lot selects a chair who is not a
citizen of that party. Id Panelists and the chair are chosen from a roster of up
to 30 individuals maintained by each party. Id. art. 2009(1). These individuals
may be scientists, experts, industry leaders, or anyone else with the relevant
knowledge to serve on the panel. Id. art. 2009(2)(a).
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to the Commission. 3 2 At this point, there is a mandate that "the
disputing parties shall agree on the resolution of the dispute,
which normally shall conform with the determinations and rec-
ommendations of the panel.' I3 3
If the report of the arbitral panel determines that a measure
is inconsistent with the terms of NAFTA, and no agreement has
been reached, the complaining party may suspend the applica-
tion of "benefits of equivalent effect" until an agreement is
reached.134 This provision provides the teeth to the dispute reso-
lution procedures. Its potential force is significant because both
the decision of whether to suspend benefits, and the determina-
tion of which benefits to suspend are the responsibilities of the
complaining party, not of the arbitral panel or the Free Trade
Commission. 135 While the party affected by the suspension may
request that the Commission establish a panel to determine
whether the level of benefits that have been suspended is "mani-
festly excessive,"'I 6 the initial power to determine which bene-
fits to suspend lies with the complaining party.
Theoretically, a country may use NAFTA's dispute resolu-
tion procedures to compel enforcement of domestic environmen-
tal laws through the provisions of the Agreements listed in
Article 104 of NAFTA.13 7 Annex III to the La Paz Agreement,
for example, provides that hazardous wastes from maquiladoras
shall be returned to the country in which the raw materials
originated: "[h]azardous waste generated in the process[ ] of...
manufacturing ... for which raw materials were utilized and
temporarily admitted, shall continue to be readmitted by the
132. Id. arts. 2017(1) and 2017(3).
133. Id. art. 2018(1).
134. Id. art. 2019(1). This suspension may be initiated 30 days after the par-
ties receive the final report. Id
135. "[Complaining party may suspend the application to the Party com-
plained against of benefits of equivalent effect .... ." Id, (emphasis added). "In
considering what benefits to suspend... a complaining party should first seek
to suspend benefits in the same sector or sectors .... " Id. art. 2019(2)(a). (em-
phasis added).
The significance of this becomes clear when compared to the seldom used
enforcement mechanism of the dispute resolution procedure in the GAT. In
the GATT mechanism, only the Contracting Parties (collective parties to the
agreement) may make the decision to allow a party to suspend concessions or
obligations under GATT. GATT, art. XXIII; 2. Under this provision of the
GATT, only one dispute has resulted in the suspension of concessions. JOHN H.
JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 96 (1989); JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD
TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT 185 (1969). For further discussion of GATT
dispute resolution procedures, see id. at 178-87.
136. NAFTA, art. 2019(3).
137. See supra part III.B.
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country of origin of the raw materials ... u"138 In addition, An-
nex III provides that each party should enforce its domestic laws
applying to transboundary shipment of hazardous wastes:
"[e]ach party shall ensure... that its domestic laws and regula-
tions are enforced with respect to transboundary shipments of
hazardous waste and hazardous substances ... that pose dangers
to public health, property and the environment."'139
Taken together, these provisions of the La Paz Agreement
constitute "specific trade obligations" within the meaning of
NAFTA Article 104.140 According to the terms of Article 104, if
La Paz Agreement obligations conflict with NAFTA provisions,
the La Paz Agreement "shall prevail to the extent of the incon-
sistency.' 14 1 In this situation, it is "inconsistent with the obliga-
tions of [NAFTA]' 142 for a party to disregard La Paz Agreement
obligations in observance of conflicting NAFTA provisions.
As an example, consider a hypothetical situation in which
Mexican authorities allow maquiladoras in Reynosa, Tamauli-
pas, to dump untreated liquid waste directly into the Rio
Grande, in blatant disregard of Mexican law,143 La Paz Agree-
138. La Paz Agreement, supra note 58, Annex III, art. XI. This interpreta-
tion assumes that article XI is indeed a mandate to maquiladoras, and not
merely an obligation of the country where the raw materials originated. See
supra note 74. Although this issue was rendered moot by Mexico's General
Ecology Law, it would require a reconsidered interpretation in this context.
This is because Article 104 of NAFTA refers to obligations in trade agreements,
and not to obligations of domestic law.
139. La Paz Agreement, supra note 58, Annex III, art. 11(2). Although the
Annexes to the La Paz Agreement are not expressly included within Article
104(1) of NAFTA, the Annexes existing at the time of the signing of NAFTA
will most likely be interpreted as part of the La Paz Agreement. Any future
Annexes to the La Paz Agreement will probably have to be agreed upon in
accordance'with Article 104(2) of NAFTA: "The Parties may agree in writing
to modify Annex 104.1 to include any amendment to the agreements listed in
paragraph 1, and any other environmental or conservation agreement."
140. Because maquiladoras are plants that manufacture for export, obliga-
tions in international agreements concerning the operation of maquiladoras
must be considered "trade obligations." The obligation to ensure that hazard-
ous wastes are disposed of in a specific manner, especially considering that dis-
posal involves transboundary shipments between the parties to the La Paz
Agreement, must certainly be considered a "specific trade obligation" within
the meaning of Article 104 of NAFTA. The corresponding obligation to enforce
domestic laws with respect to shipments of hazardous wastes from maqui-
ladoras, referred to in the La Paz Agreement, Annex III, Article 11(2), is a nec-
essary component of the obligation to dispose of hazardous wastes in a specified
manner. Enforcement is therefore part of the "specific trade obligation" that
has been created in the La Paz Agreement, Annex III, Articles 11(2) and XI.
141. NAFTA, art. 104(1).
142. NAFTA, art. 2004. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
143. Mexico's General Ecology Law regulates the disposal of hazardous
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ment obligations,144 and U.S. EPA objections. In response, the
United States, fearing that this indiscriminate disposal will cre-
ate dangerous environmental conditions in McAllen, Texas, and
other communities down river, initiates NAFTA's dispute reso-
lution procedures in an attempt to compel Mexican authorities
to enforce applicable regulations. The United States charges
that Mexican authorities in Reynosa have relaxed environmen-
tal standards in order to encourage investment, in violation of
Article 1114 of NAFTA. 145 The United States further argues
that hazardous wastes from maquiladoras should be returned to
the United States in accordance with La Paz Agreement obliga-
tions. Mexico responds by arguing that they are simply applying
environmental standards in accordance with Articles 904 and
1102 of NAFTA, which allow them to choose their own stan-
dards of environmental regulation, so long as it is done on a non-
discriminatory basis. 146
In this situation, the text of NAFTA supports the U.S. posi-
tion because specific trade obligations in the La Paz Agreement
- the obligations to ensure that hazardous wastes from maqui-
ladoras are disposed of in a specific manner 147 - are inconsis-
tent with NAFTA provisions allowing Mexico to determine
their own standards of environmental regulation.148 According
to Article 104 of NAFTA, the obligations of the La Paz Agree-
ment "shall prevail to the extent of the inconsistency." Accord-
ingly, the dispute may be the subject of NAFTA's Chapter 20
dispute resolution procedures because it addresses "the applica-
tion of this Agreement," and concerns "an actual.., measure of
another Party... [that] is ... inconsistent with the obligations of
this Agreement."'1 49 The non-enforcement of environmental
regulations among the maquiladoras is inconsistent with the ob-
ligation not to derogate from environmental measures in order
to acquire or retain investment.
wastes, and requires that all hazardous wastes from maquiladoras be returned
to the country of origin of raw materials. See supra notes 43-44 and accompany-
ing text.
144. See supra notes 138-39 and accompanying text.
145. See supra note 113 and accompanying text.
146. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
147. See supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
148. See supra notes 110-11 and accompanying text.
149. NAFTA, art. 2004. It is not clear whether non-enforcement of domestic
law will be considered a "measure" within the meaning of Article 2004 of
NAFTA. Even if it is not, however, the dispute involves "the application of
[NAFTA]." Id. This is enough to place it within the authority of Chapter 20
dispute resolution procedures.
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While the preceding hypothetical may appear to present a
plausible situation in which NAFTA could be useful in address-
ing environmental concerns, several practical difficulties pre-
clude the NAFTA from effectively protecting the environment
in this manner. First and foremost, it is not at all clear that Ar-
ticle 1114 of NAFTA, in discouraging the attraction of invest-
ment by relaxing environmental standards, constitutes the type
of obligation which may be the subject of Chapter 20 dispute res-
olution procedures.
As mentioned previously, the language of Article 1114
phrases the obligation to maintain environmental standards us-
ing the word "should" rather than "shall."'15 Because the word
"should" does not normally imply binding legal force, Article
1114 might be interpreted as imposing no obligation at all. In
order to successfully assert that Article 1114 does impose a legal
obligation, a complaining party must resort to arguments of good
faith and general purpose,' 15 rather than relying on the strength
of the text. As the only provision of NAFTA with which non-
enforcement of environmental regulations may be inconsistent,
the interpretation of Article 1114's obligatory nature is crucial to
its role in dispute resolution procedures. If Article 1114 is not
interpreted as a legal obligation, disputes over non-enforcement
of environmental regulations would not be redressible under
NAFTA's dispute resolution procedures. 152
A second problem with the language of Article 1114 is that
it refers to actual standards, and not to enforcement of those
standards. 5 3 In order to allege a violation of this provision, re-
laxing enforcement of environmental measures must be inter-
preted as relaxing the environmental measures themselves.
This is not entirely implausible, for the word "measures" may
150. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
151. An argument in support of interpreting Article 1114 as carrying at least
a degree of legally binding force might be based upon the lack of good faith of
the offending party. Even if the obligation not to relax environmental stan-
dards is not mandatory, the inclusion of the non-mandatory provision imposes
the obligation to at least make a good faith attempt to comply with that provi-
sion. Furthermore, even without mandatory language, the general purpose of
the provision is clear, and the parties are obligated to make good faith efforts to
effectuate that purpose.
152. In this situation, non-enforcement of environmental regulations would
not be redressible under NAFTA because non-enforcement would not be "in-
consistent with the obligations of [NAFTA]." NAFTA, art. 2004. See supra
note 149 and accompanying text.
153. NAFTA, art. 1114(2) states in pertinent part: "it is inappropriate to en-




encompass standards of enforcement as well as standards of reg-
ulation. Furthermore, a party must establish that non-enforce-
ment of those standards promotes investment. 154 Whether this
has occurred requires a case by case determination, and is not
amenable to generalization over a wide range of situations.
In addition to employing non-obligatory and somewhat am-
biguous language, Article 1114 independently provides for con-
sultations. 55 Should a dispute between parties arise under
Article 1114, non-binding consultations mandate only that "the
two Parties shall consult with a view to avoiding any such en-
couragement."' 56 The existence of these consultations as a sepa-
rate dispute resolution procedure may preclude the Chapter 20
general dispute resolution mechanism because a more specific
one is provided in Article 1114. Although there is no language in
either Article 1114 or Chapter 20 that explicitly precludes the
initiation of Chapter 20 dispute resolution procedures if Article
1114 consultations fail to resolve the dispute, 57 Article 1114 con-
sultations may have been intended to replace any other forms of
dispute resolution involving this provision. If this is the case, the
non-binding consultations of Article 1114, rather than a dispute
resolution procedure that may ultimately allow the "suspension
of benefits" to the offending party, 58 are the only means by
which problems of non-enforcement of environmental regula-
tions may be redressed under NAFTA.
Using Article 104 references to environmental treaties as a
basis for finding obligations under NAFTA is problematic as
well, because the Agreements listed in Article 104 take prece-
dence over NAFTA only to the extent of the inconsistency be-
154. Whether such non-enforcement must be explicitly for the purpose of
promoting investment, or may simply have the effect of promoting investment
is unclear. This is a matter of interpretation that will probably not be decided
until the question is directly addressed in an actual dispute. The complaining
party would argue that the effect of promoting investment is enough to consti-
tute a violation under Article 1114.
155. See supra note 115 and accompanying text.
156. NAFTA, art. 1114(2).
157. The inclusion of a provision for consultations in Article 1114 indicates
that these consultations must be resorted to before initiating formal dispute res-
olution procedures under Chapter 20. NAFTA Article 2004 provides that
"[e]xcept as otherwise provided in this Agreement, the dispute settlement pro-
visions of this Chapter shall apply .... This does not seem to exclude disputes
over Article 1114 from these procedures. Moreover, the reference to "other
consultative provisions of this Agreement" in Article 2006(5) seems to suggest
that dispute resolution procedures apply equally to provisions outside of Chap-
ter 20 that require consultations.
158. See supra notes 134-136 and accompanying text.
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tween NAFTA and the specific obligations of the conflicting
agreement. 159 Obligations under the La Paz Agreement, for ex-
ample, would only be implicated if a party's failure to enforce
domestic environmental laws were somehow linked to provi-
sions of NAFTA. 16° It is more likely, however, that the failure
to enforce these laws would result from factors unrelated to
NAFTA. 161 In this case, although a party has failed to meet the
obligations in the La Paz Agreement, no inconsistency exists.
The provisions of NAFVTA are not implicated, and the dispute
resolution procedures are therefore unavailable.
Another problem with the use of Article 104 in dispute reso-
lution procedures is that it requires a "specific trade obligation"
of an environmental agreement to conflict with NAFTA obliga-
tions before the outside agreement will be given precedence. 162
General environmental obligations contained in those agree-
ments will therefore never take precedence over NAFTA.
Given that the agreements currently listed in Article 104 contain
very few "specific trade obligations,"' 63 situations which require
deference to these agreements will seldom arise in the context
of NAFTA.
IV. OTHER SOLUTIONS
As it becomes clear that NAFTA's solutions to the maqui-
ladora problem are limited at best, a more fundamental question
must be addressed. Is a free trade agreement the best place to
find solutions to environmental problems? Environmentalists
argue that it is unconscionable to remove trade barriers without
ensuring that we do not create a pollution haven along our
southern border.t64 If the United States had complete control to
159. NAFTA, art. 104(1). See supra text accompanying note 141.
160. In the preceding hypothetical, for example, Mexico had justified non-
enforcement of environmental regulations with Articles 904 and 1102 of
NAFTA. See supra text accompanying note 146.
161. The lack of economic resources, for example, is a much more plausible
reason for non-enforcement of environmental regulations than is the desire to
attract investment, or to autonomously control domestic environmental stan-
dards. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
162. NAFTA, art. 104. See also supra note 107 and accompanying text.
163. In fact, the provisions listed supra at notes 138-39 are most likely the
only parts of the La Paz Agreement that might be interpreted as "specific trade
obligations." See also supra note 108 and accompanying text.
164. Michael Fischer, Safeguard the Environment When Increasing Trade,
S.F. CHRON., Aug. 28, 1992, at A29. Michael Fischer is executive director of the
Sierra Club in Washington, D.C. Fischer argues that by endorsing NAFTA
without mandating U.S. companies in Mexico to comply with U.S. environmen-
[Vol. 2:323
MAQUILDoRAS AND NAFTA
avoid such a possibility, perhaps these arguments would be more
compelling. An ideal trade agreement would allow the removal
of trade barriers while mandating that environmental standards
would be maintained, harmonized, and rigorously enforced. It is
unrealistic, however, to expect NAFTA to live up to these
aspirations. 65
Historically, Mexico has been resistant to U.S. efforts to
control Mexican domestic policies.' 66 In the political context in
which NAFTA was negotiated, historical distrust generated a
great deal of Mexican resistance to creating such a permanent
relationship with the United States.167 As a result, the Mexican
government has taken the firm position that environmental
problems along the border should be addressed through coopera-
tive efforts of the United States and Mexico,168 rather than by
U.S. interference or coercion. The Bush Administration also ad-
vanced this position, and it is the assumption under which the
NAFTA negotiations were conducted.169 Realistically, there-
tal law, the Bush Administration is sacrificing environmental safety and public
health standards. Id.
165. In testimony before the International Trade Subcommittee of the Sen-
ate Finance Committee, William Reilly, the former Administrator of the Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency commented that NAFTA cannot, and should not,
be asked to carry the amount of "environmental freight" that many people are
suggesting it should. Although Mr. Reilly's terminology might have been more
artfully chosen, his point is that as a trade agreement, and not an environmen-
tal agreement, NAFTA is not the appropriate forum in which to address the full
spectrum of environmental problems in Mexico and the United States. Interna-
tional Trade Subcommittee of the Senate Finance Committee, FEDERAL NEWS
SERVICE, Sept. 16, 1992, at *40, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Omni File.
166. This historic antipathy is one reason that attempts to impose U.S. envi-
ronmental standards on Mexico would probably be counterproductive and of-
fensive to the Mexican government. Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at 287.
167. Jesus Silva & Richard K. Dunn, A Free Trade Agreement Between the
United States and Mexico: The Right Choice?, 27 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 937, 945
(1990). For further discussion on historical Mexican attitudes towards foreign
investment, see id. at 945-53.
168. Louis Donaldo Colosio, Environment and Development in Mexico, (re-
marks at the U.S.-Mexico Border Environment Assembly and Colloquy, June
25, 1992) (on file with the Minnesota Journal of Global Trade). Colosio asserted
that "effective solutions will be reached only by strengthening cooperation,
sharing technological advances and articulating efforts from all environmental
agencies." In addition, Colosio proposed the idea that Canada also participate in
these cooperative efforts. Id.
169. William K. Reilly, Pollution Won't Be a Byproduct, L.A. TIMEs, Aug. 2,
1992, at M5. William Reilley was the administrator of the U.S. Environmental
Protection Agency during the Bush Administration. Reilley argues that
NAF IA is an environmentally responsible agreement, but refers mainly to co-
operative efforts between the United States and Mexico that "complement the
environmental provisions of the agreement." Id.
1993]
MiNN. J. GLOBAL TRADE
fore, the most hope in solving the maquiladora problem lies in
cooperative efforts between the governments of the United
States and Mexico. 170
The most promising of these such efforts has been under-
way for over a year. The Environmental Plan for the Mexican-
U.S. Border (The Border Plan), signed by President Bush and
President Salinas de Gortari in March of 1992, is a comprehen-
sive agreement designed to address current environmental
problems on the border in a cooperative manner.17' This plan
coordinates joint U.S-Mexican enforcement projects, outlines
training programs, and provides a plan for infrastructure devel-
opment at the border.172 The Border Plan will potentially be
the primary vehicle through which international environmental
provisions affecting the border region will be developed and
enforced. 173
Under the Border Plan, bilateral efforts between the EPA
and SEDESOL will come in four different forms. First, a bi-na-
tional working group has been formed to serve as a formal
mechanism for shaping cooperative enforcement efforts, and de-
veloping a strategy to enhance these efforts. 74 Second, the EPA
and SEDESOL will attempt to build enforcement capacity by
conducting cooperative training visits to facilities on both sides
of the border, and having inspectors and other enforcement per-
sonnel of both agencies meet regularly in workshops, seminars,
170. Another suggested solution to the maquiladora problem is for the
United States to require American companies operating in Mexico to comply
with U.S. environmental standards. See supra note 164. While this type of solu-
tion may produce short-term results, it is limited because it does nothing to help
Mexico deal with an essentially Mexican problem. As future border develop-
ment includes Mexican and non-American foreign companies, U.S. legislation
will be unable to reach these companies. Moreover, enforcement of U.S. legisla-
tion in Mexico would require infringement on Mexico's national sovereignty, a
subject of historic sensitivity. See supra note 166 and accompanying text. For
further discussion on this type of proposal, see Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at
291-92.
171. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 20. The general goal of
the Border Plan is to provide long-term environmental protection to the border
area. Four specific objectives of the border plan are to: (1) strengthen enforce-
ment of existing laws; (2) reduce pollution through new initiatives; (3) increase
cooperative planning, training, and education; and (4) improve understanding of
the border environment. Id.
172. BNA Environmental Provisions, supra note 10, at 245.
173. The Border Plan is a long-term plan intended to guide environmental
efforts along the border into the 21st century. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY,
supra note 3, at 20. See also Reilly, supra note 169 and accompanying text.
174. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 21.
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and field exercises.175 Third, enforcement information will be
shared between the two agencies through a coordinated and
computerized system of tracking hazardous waste shipments
crossing the border.176 Finally, cooperative enforcement actions
will be undertaken in which personnel from SEDESOL and the
EPA will work together to achieve stated environmental
goals. 177
Cooperative training and educational programs under the
Border Plan will target emergency preparedness and response
personnel, government officials, the private sector, and the
general public.178 The goals of these programs will be to in-
crease public safety and to involve the public in protecting the
border environment.179 While environmentalists have criticized
NAFTA for failing to provide for public involvement in the en-
forcement of environmental laws,8 0 the Border Plan reflects
this type of commitment. The Mexican government has also
emphasized social participation as essential to the success of
solving environmental challenges.' 8 '
The Border Plan provides plans for infrastructure develop-
ment through several new initiatives that will be undertaken
175. Id. These efforts reflect the belief that an understanding of the other's
legal system, regulatory approaches, and enforcement methods are essential to
success in improving enforcement capacity. Id.
176. I& at 22.
177. Id. These activities may include practical measures such as unan-
nounced, high visibility inspection at border crossings, as well as planning meas-
ures, such as the targeting of geographic areas of mutual interest and concern
for extra protection. Id
178. Id. at 28.
179. Id. Educational programs are the primary method with which the Bor-
der Plan hopes to initiate public participation in environmental efforts. The
EPA's participation in educational efforts will be governed by the National En-
vironmental Education Act, 20 U.S.C. §§ 5501-5510, which calls for joint efforts
with Mexico and Canada to develop environmental education initiatives. EPA
BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 28-29.
180. ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 4-5. In NAFTA's dispute
resolution procedures in particular, environmental groups had hoped that pub-
lic participation would be incorporated. They argue that public participation is
important as a means of ensuring accountability, and for the purpose of illumi-
nating broader social concerns. Id.
181. In an interview with the National Wildlife Foundation, Mexican Presi-
dent Carlos Salinas de Gortari asserted that:
There is no way to solve the environmental challenges without social
participation. It's not only a governmental responsibility, which it is,
but it also requires a very strong social participation and I'm very satis-
fied with the growing movement of nongovernmental organizations in
Mexico. I welcome them and they are participating more and more.
"We Are Talking About Our Children". A Conversation with Mexico's Presi-
dent, INTERNATIONAL WILDLIFE, Sept./Oct. 1992, at 50.
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during its first stage. In order to protect drinking water sup-
plies, for example, funds will be made available for the construc-
tion and improvement of drinking water systems in colonias. l8 2
In order to improve the disposal of solid and hazardous wastes,
the Border Plan calls for approximately $25 million in Mexican
investment to expand solid waste collection capacity and con-
struct new landfills in several border cities.1i 3 In an effort to
improve urban air quality, Mexico also plans to invest approxi-
mately $168 million for the improvement of border area roads,
bridges, traffic circulation and public transportation systems
during the first stage of the Border Plan.i s4 The lack of specific
project proposals and funding plans, something that NAFTA has
been criticized for, ls5 is less of a problem with the Border Plan.
The Border Plan has been criticized, however, for lacking
practical mechanisms to implement many of its ultimate
goals.1i 6 Indeed, the Border Plan is still in its evolutionary
stages, and only addresses the three year period from 1992 to
1994.187 The second stage, covering the period from 1995 to 2000,
will use information obtained from current studies to continue
combatting environmental problems.188 Future activities will
likely focus on air and water quality, hazardous waste controls,
182. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 24. These funds will be
available in the form of loans from the State of Texas, the EPA, and the Rural
Development Administration of the U.S. Department of Agriculture. Id.
183. Id. at 25. These plans include the purchase of containers, collection ve-
hicles, and heavy equipment for landfills; the purchase of waste collection
equipment; and the construction of landfills. Id
184. Id. This part of the plan does not affect air pollution caused by direct
emissions from maquiladoras. Air pollution caused by urbanization that has re-
sulted from the development of the maquiladora industry, however, is as much
a part of the maquiladora problem as air pollution directly emitted from plants.
See supra note 33 and accompanying text.
185. ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 2. Environmental groups
criticize NAFTA for lacking a funding mechanism for infrastructure develop-
ment, and environmental enforcement and clean-up. Id.
186. Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at 265. The lack of specificity of the
Border Plan has prompted critics to characterize it as nothing more than a set
of "plans to plan." Economist Proposes That NAFTA Include Trinational
Superfund for Environment, Daily Rep. for Execs. (BNA) Nov. 1, 1991, at A2
(cited in Feeley & Knier, supra note 23, at 265 n.46).
187. Region IV - Regional Administrator Wynne Focuses on Cleaning up
.S.-Mexico Border Area, Int'l Envtl Daily (BNA) Aug. 17, 1992, at *6, available
in WESTLAW, BNA-IED Database. The Border Plan is an evolutionary initia-
tive, in which future projects will depend upon the success and knowledge
gained from previous experience within the plan. Id.
188. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 30. The activities un-
dertaken during the second stage of the Border Plan will be defined by the
information collected during the first stage. Id.
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information exchanges, and assessments of environmental im-
pact of new and existing companies. 189 Although it is now im-
possible to measure the degree of success that the Border Plan
will ultimately achieve, the fact that it aggressively addresses
current environmental problems along the border should be
viewed optimistically.
While the Border Plan provides hope for the productive res-
olution of the maquiladora problem, the political reality is that it
is not mandated by the La Paz Agreement, NAFTA, or any
other binding international agreement. 90 The implementation
of its programs depends upon funding by both the U.S. and Mex-
ican governments. The Bush Administration's fiscal year 1993
budget request included over $240 million for the protection of
the border environment. 191 Although Congress did not approve
the entire request,192 it is reasonably certain that significant
funding will be available from the United States. 193 The pivotal
issue is whether Mexico will be able to appropriate sufficient
funding to support the Border Plan, and otherwise provide ade-
quate environmental protection for the border area.
Economic benefits generated by NAFTA are likely to pro-
vide a significant increase in technical and human resources in
189. New Rules - The NAFTA Adds an International Dimension to Environ-
mental Regulation, Business Mexico, Oct. 1992, at *5-6, available in LEXIS,
Nexis Library, Omni File.
190. Increasingly, however, both critics and supporters of NAFTA have
called for a supplemental environmental side agreement to accompany
NAFTA. See, e.g., Memorandum from C. Ford Runge and Raymond Mikesell,
Recommendations for Meeting Environmental Concerns Regarding North
American Free Trade Agreement Without Renegotiating the Agreement
(NAFTA) (Jan. 29, 1993) (on file with The Minnesota Journal of Global Trade).
Such an agreement would likely apply a degree of legally binding force to coop-
erative initiatives such as the Border Plan. In addition, environmental officials
in the United States, Mexico, and Canada have proposed the formation of a
North American Commission on the Environment, a trilateral group to oversee
the environmental aspects of NAFTA. NAFTA. Focus on Side Deals, Legisla-
tion, NWF Official Advises Environmentalists, Int'l Envtl. Daily (BNA) Feb. 8,
1993, at *3, available in WESTLAW, BNA-IED Database.
191. EPA BORDER PLAN SUMMARY, supra note 3, at 33. This request in-
cluded, inter alia, $30 million for water-related facilities, $2 million for public
health projects, and $5.4 million for credit and loan guarantees for environmen-
tal projects. Id. at 32-33.
192. News Release, Office of the Press Secretary, Statement by the Presi-
dent, Aug. 12, 1992, at *3, available in WESTLAW, NAFTA Database.
193. While the Environmental Report complains that "funds for these nec-
essary expenditures would be subject to the vagaries of the appropriations pro-
cess in the U.S.," the contention is that funding levels will not be appropriately
high, not that they will not be significant. ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note
90, at 3.
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Mexico.194 This expectation has been fueled by several studies
which have suggested that NAFTA will most likely lead to im-
provement of Mexican environmental problems.195 An exten-
sively cited study by Gene Grossman and Alan Krueger of
Princeton University, for example, found that with the increase
of per capita income, more resources become available to pre-
vent environmental damage. When a country's per capita in-
come reaches about $4,000 to $5,000 U.S. dollars, economic
growth tends to correspond with the alleviation of pollution
problems.196 With a per capita GDP of about $5,000, Mexico is
currently at a point where further economic growth is likely to
be accompanied by improving environmental conditions. 197
The concept of using wealth generated by NAFTA to ad-
dress pre-existing environmental problems has been criticized
by certain environmental groups as "environmental deficit fi-
nancing.' 198 The concept, however, has received widespread
support by economists' 99 and many environmentalists. 2° ° Be-
cause it is well known that environmental clean-up and preven-
tion requires economic resources, the idea makes intuitive sense.
As the Los Angeles Times editorial board asserts:
194. Mexico: Foreign Investors Will Not Be Able to Pollute Environment,
Top Official Says, 15 Int'l Envtl Rep. (BNA) 527 (Aug. 17, 1992).
195. See, e.g., G.M. Grossman & A.B. Krueger, Environmental Impacts of a
North American Free Trade Agreement, paper prepared for a conference on the
U.S.-Mexico Free Trade Agreement, Princeton University, Oct. 1991 (linking
economic growth with the alleviation of pollution problems); Linda Trocki, Sci-
ence, Technology, Environment and Competitiveness in a North American
Context, paper presented at a meeting of the North American Institute, Nov. 8-
9, 1991 (examining economically efficient implementation of environmental
regulation); and Adalberto Garcia Rocha & Marco Antonio Michel Diaz, An Es-
timate of the Environmental Impact of Free Trade with Mexico, paper delivered
at a conference at the Pacific Research Institute for Public Policy, Dec. 1991 ("A
free trade area will have a major positive impact on the environment through
the widening of technological alternatives, both in processes and in products
196. Grossman & Krueger, supra note 195, at 19.
197. Id at 20.
198. ENVIRONMENTAL REPORT, supra note 90, at 1.
199. See supra note 195 and accompanying text.
200. According to Jay Hair, president of the National Wildlife Federation:
The job ahead is to forge environmentally sound free-trade agree-
ments, beginning with Mexico. We should not obstruct a path that can
lead to significant international benefits .... The means of addressing
environmental concerns are directly tied to economic development. If
environmental progress is not to remain solely the property of affluent
nations, developing nations must have their fair shot at progress. Free
Trade incorporating sound environmental principles enhances that
prospect of advancement.
Jay Hair, Nature Can Live with Free Trade, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1991, § 4 at 17.
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Arguing for strict environmental controls in Mexico before a free-trade
pact is in place is akin to putting the proverbial cart before the horse.
The political will to clean up pollution exists; the question is not
whether Mexico wants to clean up its act, but how. A free-trade pact is
part of the answer.
201
V. CONCLUSION
Given the expectation of further increase in development in
the border area in the wake of NAFTA, the maquiladora prob-
lem assumes a great sense of urgency. Solutions require both a
commitment to correct the problem, and the resources to do so.
While concerns that NAFTA may exacerbate the maquiladora
problem are not unfounded, this does not mean that solutions to
the problem must be found solely in NAFTA itself. NAFTA
does not offer, nor does it purport to offer, solutions to such seri-
ous environmental problems. As a trade agreement, rather than
an environmental agreement, it has only limited tools to address
environmental problems. The success of solutions such as those
contained in the Border Plan, however, may well depend on the
financial resources which NAFIA promises to bring. If these
resources are applied effectively, cooperative initiatives such as
the Border Plan offer realistic and effective solutions to the ma-
quiladora problem.
201. It Costs Money to be Clean, L.A. TIMES, Nov. 29,1991, at B4 (emphasis in
original).
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